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ABSTRACT 
 
Since the 1990s, transport concessions, including public-private partnerships (PPPs), have 
been increasingly adopted by governments as an alternative for financing and operations in 
public investments, especially in transport infrastructure. The advantage pointed out by 
proponents of these models lies in merging the expertise and capital of the private sector to 
the public interest. Several arrangements are possible and have been employed in different 
cases. After the duration of the first PPP contracts in transportation, many authors have 
analyzed the success and failure factors of partnerships. The occurrence of failures in some 
stages of the process can greatly encumber the public administration, incurring losses to the 
fiscal responsibility of the competent bodies. This article aims to propose a new commercial 
consolidation model applied to transport infrastructure to ensure fiscal sustainability and 
overcome the weaknesses of current models. Initially, a systematic review of the literature 
covering studies on transport concessions between 1990 and 2015 is offered, where the 
different approaches between various countries are compared and the critical success factors 
indicated in the studies are identified. In the subsequent part of the paper, an approach for 
the commercial consolidation of the infrastructure concessions is presented, where the 
concessionary is paid following a finalistic performance model, which includes the overall 
fiscal balance of regional growth. Finally, the papers analyses the usefulness of the model in 
coping with the critical success factors explained before. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
From the 1990’s decade onwards concessions have been widely used in a lot of countries, 
particularly regarding infrastructure projects.  In general lines, concessions can be classified 
according to the venture’s profitability. In the Brazilian legislation, “onerous concessions” 
are those in which the project’s financial advantages are able to remunerate the 
concessionaries without needing public subsidies, but where the Public Administration 
receives a fee; “free concessions” are those whose recipes break even the investor, but do 
not entitle the Public Administration to a fee payment; finally, the “subsidized concessions” 
do not break even, but are effectuated for strategic reasons, whereby the private sector 
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receives a compensation that complement or substitute fully the user fees in order to assure 
the break even (Machado,2005).   
 
Since 2004, the Public-Private Partnerships contracts (PPPs) have been regulated through 
the Law n. 11079, foreseeing two modalities: the “sponsored concession”, when user fees 
and compensations by the Public Administration are provided; and the “administrative 
concession”, where the Public Administration alone ensures the breakeven of the private 
investment. These modalities complement the free and onerous concessions which are ruled 
by the Law nº 8.987/1995. 
 
However, PPPs should not be regarded as a purely financial solution, since the main 
objective of PPPs is to assure that the private sector delivers timeliness, cost efficiency and 
project quality (Azevedo, 2014). Where prudential safeguards are not included, and the 
project is decided solely for political reasons, a PPP may bring serious instability to public 
finances and taxpayers. On the other side, the need for public investments in infrastructure 
in Brazil is absolutely striking but should not happen at the expense of the fiscal equilibrium 
(Afonso and Biasoto, 2007).  
 
When the concession period of the first contracts expires, it is expected that the experiences 
are assessed, allowing the analysis of achieved results, the fulfilment of the initial goals and 
the recognition of the critical factors that will have influenced positively or negatively the 
implementation of the contracts.  
 
The present paper starts with a systematic review of several academic works regarding the 
main critical factors for the success of a transportation infrastructure concessions. 
Subsequently, an alternative model for the commercial consolidation of infrastructure 
investments is exposed, which ensures fiscal equilibrium of the public expenses and delivers 
a proper response to identified critical factors.  
 
2. ASSESMENT OF CONCESSION POLICIES FOR TRANSPORTATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT  
 
A systematic literature review of the transportation infrastructure concession experiences 
may point out some research tendencies (Aragão et al., 2004): critical success factors for 
public-private partnerships have been a major theme, as it turned out in the analysis of 60 
documents. Hereby, following aspects turned out to be most relevant: a) political 
environment; b) legal environment; c) general social and economic environment; d) 
technical capacitation; e) technical characteristics of projects; f) economic and financial 
characteristics of projects and its financial engineering; g) project and contract management; 
and h) selection and contracting process.  
 
More recently, Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) made a vast review of studies published between 
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1990 and 2013 with respect to critical factors for success in public-private partnerships, 
which was not restricted to the transportation field. A more systematic review applied to the 
transportation concession theme on the 1990-2015 period revealed 46 articles in 25 journals. 
 
A great amount of publications brings up case studies of specific countries and regions. Most 
of them refer to European countries (14 papers). According to Azevedo (2014), Portugal, 
United Kingdom, Spain and Greece are the countries in Europe that have made most use of 
PPP´s.. In the second place Latin America (6 papers) stands out, although only a few studies 
have reported on the Brazilian experience. A considerable number of articles (18 papers) 
refer to the general international, not country-specific experience.   
 
Coming to the issue of the critical success factors for PPP Macário et al. (2015) highlight 
for the Portuguese experience following aspects: deficiencies in the contract preparation; 
lack of assessment tools for projects and of guidelines; poor transparency and political 
commitment; optimistic bias in demand forecasts; and political interference into the 
decision-making.  Osei-Kyei and Chan (2015) highlight other factors, such as adequacy of 
risk allocation and sharing; regulatory structure; macroeconomic stability; as well the 
financial capacity of the private sector.  
 
Another authors dedicated their studies to more specific subjects as risk allocation and 
sharing (Chung et al. 2010; Scandizzo and Ventura, 2010; Cruz and Marques, 2012; Neves, 
1995 apud Aragão et al., 2007; Franco and Pamplona, 2008). With respect to the design of 
concession contracts, Bray and Mulley (2012) point out as critical success factors the 
contract context (i.e. the underlying legal framework); the contract content (scope of the 
service, risk allocation, performance indicators); legal security and quality of contract 
management. Other aspects referred in the literature are measures to deal with with 
information asymmetry, the existence or independent regulatory bodies (Macario et al. 2015; 
Guasch and Straub, 2009). With respect to the upmost critical issue of the financial results, 
the determination of fee prices and of their top limits and readjustment rules; as well the 
consideration of extraordinary revenues make up a great part of the publications (Rocha and 
Garcia, 2011; Sirtaine et al., 2005; Schwind, 2010).  
 
The Table 1 resumes the most referred success factors, as listed by Osei-Kyei e Chan (2015), 
Macário et al. (2015) and  
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Table 1 – Critical factors for transportation concession contract success  
 
3.  THE COMERCIAL CONSOLIDATION MODEL  
3.1. Conceptual Fundaments  
The conceptual basis or the proposed commercial consolidation model is Territorial 
Engineering, which, according to Aragão and Yamashita (2010), deals with the conception 
and execution of territorial programs: these are characterized by an integrated set of 
interventions aiming to dynamize strategic planning and making major public and private 
investment projects feasible. The work field of Territorial Engineering comprises the design 
of territorial programs accordingly to several established technical, political, legal and other 
requirements, the design and putting to work of a variety of management functions (technical 
management); political advocacy strategy (political management); financial and fiscal 
management; design of contract framework; legal reforms; and information and knowledge 
management.   
 
The main idea of the territorial program is to attract and to execute a coordinated set of public 
and private investments that is able to  push up economic growth and subsequently  increase 
fiscal revenue in a determined territory. Typically, a Territorial Program should be 
constituted of a set of projects (Aragão and Yamashita (2010): 
 
Topic Critical Factor Impact 
External 
Factors 
Defined legal 
framework 
Legal uncertainty and political instability on the sector 
can impede the project execution from happening.   
Macroeconomic 
and political 
stability  
Reduces project risk and provides planning 
robustness.  
Contract 
Risks 
identification 
The previous non identification of a risk can lead to 
higher contract costs. 
Risks allocation  
 
The risk must be separately allocated with better 
management conditions or the costs will be increased 
and/or service execution intercepted.   
Demand forecast Super estimated demand to the contract may burden 
the public sector that usually assumes demand risk. 
Underestimaded demands may hide the contract 
financial feasibility.    
Responsabilities 
and roles 
transparency 
between parts  
Can avoid conflicts and roles superposition.  
Regulatory 
Structure 
Transparency and 
information flow  
Necessary aspects for the contract compliance 
assurance.  
Performance 
indicators  
The contract monitoring and control require the 
existance of measurable indicators alined to its 
objectives.  
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 Main productive projects: these are directly responsible for the aggregation of economic 
value;  
 Additional productive projects: these are a series of production projects or services 
related to the first ones, belonging to their respective supply and distribution  chain;  
 Integrative projects: these do not belong directly to production chains of the main and 
additional production projects, but aim to catalyze the value aggregation and general 
growing process, comprising entrepreneurship incentive, education, capacitation, health, 
habitation, cultural, sportive and leisure activities, security, social promotion and 
environmental management; and finally the  
 Infrastructure projects: these comprehend not only transportation, logistics and other 
technical infrastructures, but also the spatial  and environmental structure, which are an  
essential  boundary condition for the desired economic effects.   
3.2. The Commercial Consolidation Programme 
The use of PPP contracts as defined above for transportation infrastructure investment is 
progressing quickly. For the respective decision-making, traditional economic-financial 
feasibility studies are mandatory, which compare the implementation, operation and 
maintained costs with the revenue, which is basically dependent on the foreseen 
transportation demand. If this turns out to be insufficient at acceptable fare price levels, 
public sector counterparts ensure the break-even condition.  However, the demand in less 
dense but strategical growth frontiers is too low, and the level of counterpart payments may 
harm fiscal sustainability 
 
In order to overcome this financial and fiscal difficult, the proposed model (Figure 1) starts 
from an association of the conceded infrastructure investment with other projects in its 
surroundings, which are accomplished within a separate concession contract that attracts the 
investors. The legal basis of this additional and complementary contract is the concession 
for the use of public realm bound to conditions such as: a) programmed increase of traffic 
demand; and b) the production of multiplied fiscal revenues from the activities attracted to 
the region in an amount that covers the costs of the Public Administration (counterpart 
payments, additional infrastructure investments, other administrative and public service 
expenses etc.).  
 
The Figure 1 below shows up the contract structure and the resulting expected economic 
flows within the Consolidation Programme. The design process of such a territorial program 
is detailed by Aragão and Yamashita (2010); the fiscal analysis model is presented in Aragão 
et al. (manuscript), where production goals needed for accomplish fiscal sustainability 
targets and the subsequently necessary actions are explained.  
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Figure 1 – Comercial  consolidation model  
 
 
4. DISCUSSION  
 
When matched with the critical success factors for PPP contracts that have been considered 
in Section 2, the proposed model shows up a response capacity to each them, as shown in 
synthetically in the Table 2.  
 
Topic  Critical Factor  Response  
External 
Factors 
Defined legal 
framework 
The Territorial Engineering brings up a clear contract 
framework which simplifies the responsibilities and 
performance targets of each part. The private part is 
free to choose the action and means to achieve the 
targets.   
Macroeconomic 
and political 
stability  
The territorial program is designed to ensure concrete 
growth targets, which will ensure a positive 
conjuncture for the regional economy. On the other 
side, the political management process aims to ensure 
political agreements between the involved actors, 
minimizing the scenario of instability.   
Contract 
Risk management The risks are assigned more properly to the parts 
which are able to cope with them. The concentration 
of the duties of the concessionaire in economic 
performance targets makes him free to choose the 
proper means to cope with the risks.  
Demand forecast The demand is not considered as an independent 
external factor, but as a direct contract target. The 
proper business model, as delivered in the 
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procurement process by the winning bidder, shall 
demonstrate the feasibility to comply with the target. 
The measures taken to attract productive investment 
will be decided solely by the private partner, which 
will ensure enough competence for this task..  
Responsibilities 
and measures for 
transparency  
The fulfilment of the targets will be controlled 
together by the contractor and contracted parties and  
be publicized. 
Table 2 – Responses of the proposed model to its critical factors 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
The present paper starts from the discussion of the present practice of Private Public 
Partnerships (PPP) and of their critical success factors. It is shown that this practice implies 
many risks that are difficult to control and its inefficient assignment to the involved parties. 
Most of these risks are due to the facts that the economic, social and political environment 
remain outside of the action field of the parties. In order to ensure the break-even condition 
of the contracted party, the Public Administration assumes, on behalf of the taxpayer, the 
responsibility for events that are not to him to master, as economic growth, traffic demand 
of the infrastructure, and other aspects.  
 
The Territorial Program approach devolves the competencies dependent on private 
investments and production of third parties that are at the origin of traffic generation and 
revenue sources to a third private party, which will be far more competent to ensure the 
needed results. These results are then contracted by government to the private sector, which 
will enjoy full freedom to decide on the strategy and means, provided that the rules of Law 
and of the public planning are complied with. As it is conclusively shown, this approach is 
able to deal better with the critical factors for the success of the partnership contracts. 
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